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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DOROTHY W. BROWN, widow of
EMMETT L. BROWN, deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No,

-vsINDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
STATE OF UTAH, and
STATE INSURANCE FUND,

13920

Defendant-Respondent,

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to collect funds due from the
State Insurance fund for an industrial accident.
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Industrial Commission denied liability and refused
to pay to the widow of Emmett L. Brown the funds sought under
the insurance plan.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Mrs. Brown seeks a reversal of the decision of the
Industrial Commission and an award of the proceeds of the
insurance.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The deceased, Emmett L. Brown, was a Judge in the
Third Judicial District of the State of Utah from July 1,
1969, until the time of his death in October 1972.

During

the time of his tenure on the 30th day of May 1971, he
suffered a heart attack which incapacitated him and took him
from his work for a period of time.

After returning to work

he commenced first on a part time basis and then on a full
time, suffering another heart attack on the 31st day of
August 1972.

He never returned to work after that time but

died as a result of a third heart attack which occured on
the 17th day of October, 1972.
The evidence produced at the hearing indicates that
the time Judge Brown took the bench he was a healthy enthusiastic man with no objective evidence whatsoever of heart disease.

Judge Brovm's assignment was to handle matrimonial

problems which were all grouped under the general heading of
"Family Court".

The nature of the assignment of course was

to handle divorces, custody matter, inforcement of alimony and
support payments, etc.

Although his health was good at the

time he entered his office it gradually deteriorated until
after approximately two years he suffered from the first heart
attack.

Some 15 months later after some recuperation and some

extensive work he suffered the second heart attack which took
him off the bench and he never returned.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE DECISION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IS
CONTRARY TO LAW AND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The testimony outlined by all the witnesses support .
the fact that Judge Brown suffered from employment connected
stress and strain.

Particularly, Ivor Boyce, his bailiff

testified that when Judge Brown was appointed he was very
enthusiastic.

He took his responsibility that the Governor

had asked him to do and ventured an opinion that two years
in the Family Court was too long (R.40).

He further testified

that "they just appointed him the senior Judge for the Family
Court, and he would take care of the whole thing.

Then one

noon hour a week he had a meeting with the Family Services
which meant that he never did get a lunch at that time.
would just work right through.

He

And he took care of the cases

that the other Judges didn't want to handle.
and such hefd just say 'bring it intf!

If is was personal

(R.42).

Judge Brown would take an average of 15-20 divorces
a day.

His divorce cases were over 300 a month and he took

care of over 907o of all divorces (R.42).

Mr. Boyce further

testified that Judge Brown was really "up too tight11 before
his first heart attack.

Afterwards it was pressure on him

because he had been on the Family Court so long it was getting
to him.

He further had nervous tics and twitches of the face

due to pressure
(R.45).
Digitized by the Howard
W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Further testimony of Mr. Boyce indicates that the
Elwood Dennett case produced more nervous stress and strain
than at any other time (R.48,49,50).

Judge Brown became

short of temper and changed from the way he had been before.
Shortly before the time of his first heart attack and just
before it he seemed to be quite tense and not relaxed (R.51).
Mr. Brent Nelson, who was the Clerk serving in the
Brown Court testified that Judge Brown began to undergo changes
as a result of emotional stress and strain; that the first
thing he noticed about him as far as the changes were concerned
was that he became more irritable.

In the first instance he

could listen to a case calmly but later he became irritated
at the people and their pettiness (R.79).

These changes

occured after about a year on the Bench (R.79).

His condition,

at least in part, was occassioned by the Dennett case which no
one else would hear (R.81).

And there was evidence of extreme

nervousness after the first heart attack (R.83).
AuDeane Cowley, a Family Court Counselor duing the
tenure of the Judge testified that during specific cases you
could see that Judge Brown was suffering under a lot of stress
(R.111,112).

She further testified that he looked very tired

and very strained.

He looked very troubled over specific cases

(R. 113) . And indicated that Judge Brown handled between 857o
and 90% of all custody cases which he was involved (R.115,116).
That the Judge looked very tired during the last case before
his second
heart attack (R.120).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mr. Don Holladay, Administrator of the Family Court
during this period of time, testified that between 1969 and
the first heart attack in 1971, Judge Brown's demeanor changed
from a gentle even-tempered easy going pleasent person to be
around to a short tempered, haggard and much less communicative
person (R.123).

Judge Brown told him several times that he

wanted to get off the Family Court (R.124).
Dr. Gordon Evans, the personal physician of Judge
Brown, testified that he had known the Judge for eleven years
prior to his death, both as a neighbor and in a professional
capacity.

He further testified that he examined his physical

condition on the 12th of June 1969, prior to his taking the
Bench.

He found no evidence of any heart disease at that time;

that he was seen periodically thereafter for routine checks
and that he treated him at the time of the first heart attack
in May 1971, and also at the time of the second heart attack
in August and September 1972.
Dr. Evans obtained the knowledge of the increased
stress and strain on Judge Brown through conversations and
obversations (R.134), and further felt that the Judge was under
an unusual amount of stress because he was so sensitive to the
needs of the people in Court (R.136).
the elimination of stress (R.137).

His treatment prescribed

He saw him at least monthly

between the two heart attacks.
Judge Brown, according to the testimony of Dr. Evans,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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died as a result of thrombosis or soft clot of his anterior
descending branch of his coronarytor heart arteries which
stopped the passage of blood into a certain area of the heart
muscle causing the damage and his death (R.141).

Further

diagnosis of the doctor indicated that the Judge was conscientious about his job and wanted to return quickly; felt an
obligation to do his part; felt responsibility to do that, all
of which was in keeping with his personality (R.142)
Conversations with Judge Brown indicated that he
wanted to eliminate some of the pressure and change the type
of job that he was doing and change the assignment as a Judge
(R.134).

He was sensitive in a gentle way to the needs of

the people and felt that he had a difficult time walking away
from situations that he saw (R.143).
In conclusion Dr. Evans indicated that it was a
generally accepted rule of the medical profession that stress
can cause aggrevation of almost any kind of underlying disease
including heart disease (R.143).

He further concluded that

it was his opinion that the presence of stress as described in
Judge Broxvn brought about aggrevation of his existing disease
(R.143).

The direct question and answer in conclusion were

as follows:
Q. "Can you relate the presence of the stressful
situation that you have described, with the myocardial
infarction which caused his death?"

-6~
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A. "I would say that stress caused his basic
underlying disease, which eventually caused his
myocardial infarction and his death."
Q. "Are you saying that the stress caused the
disease?11
A. "It was a contributing factor in the cause
of his underlying problem.11
Further, Dr. Evans testified that the stress that
was present in Judge Brown as testified by himself and others
aggrevated the underlying disease and brought about or contributed to his death (R.158),
35-1-45 Compensation for Industrial Accidents
to be paid. Every employee mentioned in Section
35-1-43 who is injured, and the Defendants of their
every such employee is killed, by accidents arising
out of or in the course of his employment, wheresoever such injury occured, provided the same was not
purposely self-inflicted, shall be entitled to receive
and shall be paid, such compensation for loss sustained on account of such injury or death, and such amount
for medical, nurse and hospital services and medicines,
and, in case of death, such amount of funeral expenses,
as herein provided.11
"Out of and in the course of the employment" as it
formerly read before 1919 amendment substituted "or" for "and",
should be liberally construed.

Chandler vs. Industrial Commission

55 Utah 213, 184 P. 1020.
Both Dr. Evans and Dr. Frank Yanowitz were of the
opinion that there was a pre-existing coronary difficulty.

As

in the case of Powers vs. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140,
427 P. 2d 748, this Court announced that aggrevation of a preexisting disease by an industrial accident is compensable and

-7-
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and that the heart failure brought about by strain in the course
of the employment may be an accident within the meaning of the
act.
Quoting again from the case of Jones vs. California
Packing Corporation, 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 530:
"It is settled beyond question that a preexisting disease or other distrubed condition or
defect of the body, when aggrevated or lighted up
by an industrial accident is compensable under the
act; also cited: Graybar Electric Company, Inc. vs.
The Industrial Commission, 73 Utah 568, 276 P.161;
Thomas Dee Memorial Hospital Association vs. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d 233. And
also that an internal failure brought about by
exertion in the course of employment may be an
accident within the meaning of Title 42 of the Code
of 1943, without the requirement that the injury
result from some incident which happened suddenly
and is identifiable at a definite time and place.
Robertson vs. Industrial Commission, 109 Utah 25,
163 P.2d 331; Thomas Dee Memorial Hospital Association vs. Industrial Commission; Hammond vs.
Industrial Commission^ 84 Utah 67~, 3q~P .2d 687;
Purity Biscuit Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 115
Utah 1, 201 P.M~961."
'
————^——~
In addition, the case of Lumberman's Mutual Casualty
Company vs. Industrial Accident Commission, 29 Cal. 2d 492, 175
P.2d 823, supports the proposition that there is no requirement
of unusual strain.

The only showing need be that there be a

casual connection between the strain of the employment and the
injuries suffered.

This was certainly supported by the testi-

mony of Dr. Evans.

Another California case, Fireman's Fund

Indemnity vs. State Industrial Accident Commission, 39 Cal.2d
381, 250 P.2d 148, is supportive of the position of the Plaintiff

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in that it is sufficient to show that a condition (in this
case a stroke) can be reached through the cummulative effect
of each day's strain and it is not necessary to prove the one
particular exposure to strain and tension was responsible.
In New York case, Schechter vs. State Insurance Fund,
160 N.E. 2d 901, a case heard by the Court of Appeals supported
the claimant's position where he proved the strain occured in
the usual course of his employment and that the heart attack
occured at a time when he was engaged in the same general type
of work in which he was always involved.

See also Little vs.

J. Korber and Company, 71 N.M. 294,378 P.2d 119.
Although the case In the Matter of the Retirement of
Horace C. Beck did not reach the Supreme Court the reasoning of
Judge Croft supports the position that the widoxtf of Judge Brown
would be entitled to recover hereunder.
"When we are confronted with the necessity of
determining the causal connection between disability
brought on by a heart disease and the performance by
one's duty, an important element is, it seems to me,
not so much what caused it, but rather what did not
cause it. In Judge Beck's case, the only thing that
seems certain is that we cannot say that his heart
attack occured as a result of some affirmative act
on his part that had no connection with his duty as
a Judge and was in his own doing. We could not
determine x^ith any degree of medical certainty all
of the factors that contributed to the ultimate result that occured on March 16, 1969. Perhaps no one
factor "caused11 it. That the tensions and pressures
of the Judge's duties could be and probably x^as a
contributing factor seems evident from Dr. Behren's
report.ff

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, a comparison of the medical opinion
expressed by Dr. Dalrymple in the case of Inga-Lill Elton vs.
Utah State Retirement Board, 28 Utah 2d 368, 503 P.2d 137, with
that of the testimony of Dr. Evans in the instant case revealed
the following:
1.

In the Elton case (R.91) Dr. Dalrymple testified

that the underlying disease of Judge Elton could have been
aggrevated by stress.

In the testimony of Dr. Evans (R.143)

he supports the same proposition that in his opinion the underlying condition of Judge Brown was aggrevated by stress.
2.

Dr. Dalrymple expressed his opinion (R.92) that

the aggrevation hastened his death with the following:
A. "In my own humble opinion from purely
historical finding something aggrevated it and
that seemed to be the principle factor at that
time.11
In the Brown case Dr. Evans is much more certain with
the following answer:
A. "I would say that the stress caused his basic
underlying disease, which eventually caused his myocardial infarction and his death"(R.144).
From the foregoing conclusions of the two doctors we
can see that the testimony in support of the position of the
Plaintiff Mrs. Brown is stronger than that in support of the
decision of Mrs. Elton.

This being the case there can be no

•conclusion that what the trial examiner of the Industrial
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Commission failed all objective tests and erred in his conclusion
that Mrs. Brown is not entitled 'to recover.

Accordingly, this

Court should reverse the decision of the Industrial Commission
and award her the funds from the State Insurance Fund to which
she is entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
LOUIS M. HAYNIE
1847 West 2300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119
Attorney for Appellant
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